THE CONCEPT OF SPEECH ACT FROM VARIOUS SCIENTIFIC POINTS OF VIEW

Tuhtaeva Shahzoda

Independent researcher of Samarkand State Institute of

Foreign Languages.

Wittgenstein went too far, for there is good reason to separate the theory of linguistic meaning (semantics) from the theory of language use (pragmatics), not that they are unconnected. We can distinguish sentences, considered in abstraction from their use, and the acts which speakers (or writers) perform in using them. We can distinguish what sentences mean from what speakers mean in using them. Whereas Wittgenstein adopted a decidedly anti-theoretical stance toward the whole subject, Austin developed a systematic, though largely taxonomic, theory of language use. And Paul Grice developed a conception of meaning which, though tied to use, enforced a distinction between what linguistic expressions mean and what speakers mean in using them.

An early but excellent illustration of the importance of this distinction is provided by Moore's paradox. If you say, "Tomatoes are fruits but I don't believe it," you are denying that you believe what you are asserting. This contradiction is puzzling because it is not an outright logical inconsistency. That tomatoes are fruits does not entail your believing it, nor vice versa, and there's no contradiction in my saying, "Tomatoes are fruits but you don't believe it." Your inconsistency arises not from what you are claiming but from the fact that you are claiming it. That's what makes it a pragmatic contradiction.

Like pragmatic contradictions, pragmatic phenomena in general involve information that is generated by, or at least made relevant by, acts of using language. It is not to be confused with semantic information, which is carried by linguistic

items themselves. This distinction should be kept in mind as we examine the nature of speech acts (including Austin's explicit performatives), the intentions involved in communicating, and the ways in which what a speaker means can differ from what his words mean. Later we will return to the semantic-pragmatic distinction and survey its philosophical applications.

Serle's view that the speech act should be regarded as the basic, basic unit of the communication system can be fully supported. However, we have an objection to the interpretation of a speech act as a phenomenon that divides the discourse (dialogue text) into parts, rather than composing it. However, in the interpretation of linguistic phenomena, special attention should be paid to their creative potential. The speech act is no exception, it also performs the functions of composing a text, the composition of a discourse, which is a complex unit of communication.

To determine the functions of this type of speech act, it is necessary to refer to the analysis of intensity, that is, the analysis aimed at determining the purpose of speech action. Iiteitsioial analysis examines the aspects of speech activity that occur in the communicative process in relation to the speaker's purpose, desire. In general, the founders of this method of analysis (8eag1 1983) are in favor of looking at each speech movement as a unit with a single goal (single intention). But I would like to agree with the opinion of my late friend, Oleg Georgeevich Pocheptsov, a professor at Kiev University, who left this world very early. In his interpretation, "the verbal action and the goal realized through this action are only one stage in the achievement of the main goal of the speaker" (Pocheptsov 1986: 75). Therefore, the scientist proposes to divide the general intention into two parts, namely, "initial iiteitsia (matssad)" and "iatijavii iiteitsia." This type of intentional analysis really allows a more complete picture of the content of the speech act. For example, "How can I get to the station?" when the speech is pronounced, the primary goal of the speaker is to get the necessary information from the listener, i.e. to know how to get to the station. But the real intention is different: to get to the station. The same intention is the

ultimate or ultimate goal. Hence, the execution of a verbal action can be thought of as a two-stage process: in the first, the initial goal is expressed, while in the second, the final goal is formed.

O. G. Pocheptsov notes that the initial objective action corresponds mainly to the structural semantic features of the sentence. So, "How do I get to the station?" the act of the initial intention of the speech structure is the inquiry, the structure of the "Today was a meeting at the university" - darak, to report, "The initial intention in the structure of the tsaytaru of my book is unconditional, command, demand. But the resulting objective actions are, firstly, numerous in number, and secondly, for them the structural-semantic structure of the sentence is of no importance. The formation of the resulting intention depends not only on the semantic features of the sentences, but also on their activation environment, the context of the speech. In other words, the resultant goal act encompasses non-linguistic actions as well as non-linguistic actions.

All pragmalinguists acknowledge that the content of a speech act consists of a generalization of linguistic and non-linguistic features. Many of them are in favor of looking at the speech act as a three-step activity. In these stages, three different actions are performed. They are locutive, illocutive, and perlocutive movements.

In the process of communication, we create a meaningful linguistic word and perform a verbal activity by pronouncing it, the performance of the same activity is a locutation or locutive act (1osiyopagu as1). If for some reason (ignorance of the language, dumbness) the meaningful speech is not formed and it is not pronounced, the locomotive action occurs

does not come. For example, if the phrase "I drank hot tea" only remains on the record, there is no locution. However, meaningful sentences are not constructed in vain, there is a specific purpose in composing and pronouncing them (this purpose is always present in the mind of the speaker). The realization of this goal is the result of an illocutive act. Illusion is an expression of interpersonal (between

communication participants) relationships. For example, by uttering the phrase "I drank hot tea" above, it is possible to express communicative desires such as reporting the event, inviting for tea, knowing what kind of tea the interlocutor is drinking (hot or cold). It is precisely this communicative goal that determines the structure of speech in relation to which one occurs under certain conditions.

It has been said above that any communication action should be carried out with an end (ultimate) purpose. To achieve this goal, the speaker's speech must influence the listener. The interaction phase of speech activity is called the perlocutive act. We

We see the result of the pronunciation of the phrase "I drank hot tea" when the listener accepts this verbal action for the purpose we want (e.g., when the listener hears the heat of the tea and agrees to drink it). Thus, perlocution is an attempt to influence the listener's mind, emotions, and behavior.

The concept of 'illusion' is the most common concept in the theory of speech act. At the heart of the structure of the speech act is also the illocutive action. There are even cases when the illocutive act is considered as an alternative to the speech act as a whole, and the classification of the speech act is based on the indicators of the illocutive goal.

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